Should – Ought

For anyone familiar with Ancient Greek it is obvious that ‘should’ is Optative - that is, a word in the Optative mood implies options.  The Optative is a semi-subjunctive and represents what one might do rather than what one may (is permitted to) do (subjunctive).  ‘Should’ thereby implies options.  The paradigm of use for ‘should’ is: “given the options available (X,Y,Z), you should do X.”

‘Ought’ on the other hand is imperative, and implies a form of necessity – moral or legal necessity.  What one ought to do is thereby categorical and without options. One should use the word ‘ought’ in many cases to make it clear just exactly what one means.  One cannot mean what one says unless of course one says what one means.  There is a clear distinction between meaning and saying.  One can say anything even absurd things, but can one mean anything, say for instance absurd things?  One should say what one means, but one ought to mean what one says.

Optative is the verbal mood which typically is used to express wishes or hopes.  But it also has other uses, and I think the above is one of the more interesting.  One might consider the notion that what one should do is often an expression of what one wishes to prefer amongst the choices available.  By this what one should do is dependent on what one can and prefers to do, but one could leave that aside for the moment.  What one should do is a matter of prudent decision making. But what one ought to do is categorical and moral (or legal).  One ought to obey the law and that implies that one is obligated in some manner to legal and moral obedience.  An obligation is of course an internal matter.  It is not a matter of external compulsion.  One can be compelled to do what one is not obliged to do.  But that would entail that there is a reluctance upon the part of the one who is compelled.  If a person is compelled to do what he/she feels no obligation to do, there is resistance in the act.

Of course there is also the possibility of internal compulsion.  The mentally or emotionally disturbed individual may act in accordance with his/her diseased compulsion, and in that sense cannot help doing what they do.  This is obvious in the case of addiction.  But it is also true that one can overcome one’s addictions, because there is no obligation to continue with the addiction.  One is not obliged to what one is addicted to, but one is compelled to do so – internally compelled.  So in essence one should overcome one’s addictions, but there is no sense to the notion that one ought to do so, although we often use ‘ought’ in such cases.  Here there is a clear distinction between the necessity of an obligation and the necessity of a compulsion.  Clearly one is not obligated to adhere to one’s compulsions or addictions, and one should overcome them.

The distinction between ‘should’ and ‘ought’ is similar to the distinction Kant makes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.  A hypothetical imperative always has, either expressed or implied, a protasis attached to it – an “if” clause; e. g. If one wants to be happy, do X, if one seeks pleasure, then do Y, etc.  The protasis defines what the end (desired result) of the imperative is.  Morality according to Kant though is categorical and not simply a matter of hypothetical imperatives which are more a matter of prudence.  Here morality is not a matter of desire, or happiness, pleasure or any other sort of hypothetical situation.  Morality is a categorical situation.  Morality is what one ought to do, and not merely what one should do, or what is prudent to do.  When we speak of morality we speak of what we are obliged to do, what we ought to do.  It may be prudent occasionally to do what we ought not, but that would be immoral.